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We make use of a new and detailed database on FDI approvals since the early 1990s to 
address two major issues related to FDI and regional development in India in the post-reform 
period. First, we analyze the location choices of foreign investors. The evidence indicates 
that the concentration of FDI in a few relatively advanced regions may have prevented FDI 
effects from spreading across the Indian economy. Second, we evaluate whether the link 
between FDI and economic growth has become stronger in the aftermath of reforms. Various 
categories of FDI are indeed positively correlated with per-capita income growth across 
Indian states. However, it is only for the richer states that FDI appears to be associated with 
higher growth. FDI is thus likely to increase regional income disparity in India.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India soared from less than US$ 2 
billion in 1991, when the country undertook major reforms to open up the economy to 
world markets, to more than US$ 50 billion in 2006 (UNCTAD (2007), p. 257). 
Policymakers in India as well as external observers attach high expectations to FDI. 
According to the Minister of Finance, P. Chidambaram, “FDI worked wonders in China 
and can do so in India” (Indian Express, November 11, 2005). Bajpai and Sachs (2000, p. 
1) advise policymakers in India to throw wide open the doors to FDI which is supposed 
to bring “huge advantages with little or no downside.” 
The major objective of this paper is to analyze whether the currently prevailing 
euphoria with respect to FDI effects in India is supported by empirical facts. In Section 2 
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we summarize major arguments in the previous literature why FDI may fall short of high 
expectations in promoting growth and alleviating poverty. In particular, FDI effects on 
regional development in India are open to question, i.e., whether FDI helps poorer 
regions in India to catch up with more advanced regions. Evidence available for China 
rather suggests that FDI contributed to widening income gaps between prospering 
coastal regions and provinces in the hinterland (e.g., Fujita and Hu (2001), Zhang and 
Zhang (2003)). 
The present paper draws on a new and unpublished database on FDI approvals since 
the early 1990s. In Section 3 we explain why this detailed database can help resolve at 
least some of the disputed issues concerning FDI in the post-reform era. In Section 4, we 
analyze the location choices of foreign investors. In particular, we argue that the 
concentration of FDI in a few relatively advanced locations may have prevented FDI 
effects from spreading across the Indian economy. We take the sectoral composition of 
FDI into account, which offers additional insights even though a finer disaggregation 
would be required to differentiate clearly between different FDI motivations. 
Section 5 turns to the question whether FDI has been associated with higher growth 
and less poverty in Indian states. The lack of regionally disaggregated data on possible 
growth determinants other than FDI constrains us in assessing the relative importance of 
FDI. Moreover, intricate questions about causality are almost impossible to resolve. Yet 
the available evidence suggests that FDI has led to regional divergence, rather than 
convergence. We outline some directions for future research in the concluding section. 
 
 
2.    EARLIER FINDINGS AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
 
Indian policymakers are in good company when expecting wonders from FDI. The 
so-called Monterrey Consensus, achieved at the UN Conference on Financing for 
Development in 2002, famously declared: “Foreign direct investment contributes toward 
financing sustained economic growth over the long term. It is especially important for its 
potential to transfer knowledge and technology, create jobs, boost overall productivity, 
enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, and ultimately eradicate poverty through 
economic growth and development” (UN (2002), p. 5) However, the empirical evidence 
supporting this view across developing host countries of FDI is weak at best (e.g., 
Nunnenkamp (2004)). 
Likewise, earlier studies on India typically failed to find a robust and positive link 
between inward FDI and economic growth, including Agrawal (2005) and Pradhan 
(2002).
1 The evidence is particularly weak as concerns causation running from FDI to 
 
 
1 By contrast, Sahoo and Mathiyazhagan (2003) conclude that FDI inflows have played a vital role in the 
Indian economy. These authors apply co-integration methods developed by Johansen, using annual time 
series data on FDI and GDP from 1980 to 2001. Interestingly, Sahoo and Mathiyazhagan (2002) came to FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POST-REFORM INDIA  57 
economic growth in India, pointing to a wide gap between political rhetoric and 
economic reality.
2 Several arguments have been advanced in the literature to explain 
why FDI may have fallen short of high expectations: 
First of all, FDI flows to India may still be too low to make a big difference (Bhat et 
al. (2004)). The recent boom notwithstanding, FDI inflows in 2004-2006 amounted to 
just 5.2 percent of gross fixed capital formation in India, compared to about 13 percent 
for all developing economies (UNCTAD (2007), Annex Table B.3). However, this gap 
can be attributed at least partly to a “large-country bias,” according to which 
international trade and investment relations typically play a smaller role for larger 
countries. Comparing India and China, i.e., similarly large countries, FDI still accounts 
for a smaller share of overall capital formation in India than in China (8.3 percent), but 
the gap is substantially reduced. 
Second, economy-wide growth effects may have been compromised by the type of 
FDI India has attracted. Growth effects largely depend on whether firm-specific assets 
that foreign investors are supposed to have spill over to local firms (Lipsey (2002), Görg 
and Greenaway (2004)). Spillovers tend to be more pronounced if (backward and 
forward) linkages between foreign and local companies are strong. However, the Asian 
Development Bank expressed concerns about “the apparently limited linkages between 
MNEs and local firms” in India (ADB (2004), p. 228).
3  
Third, economy-wide growth effects of FDI in India may be hindered if FDI is 
concentrated in relatively advanced locations (Aggarwal (2005)). To the extent that 
greater openness to FDI in the post-reform era has lead to further agglomeration, FDI 
may have fuelled regional divergence, rather than promoting convergence. The 
Schumpeterian growth model presented by Aghion et al. (2006) provides an explanation 
why more FDI may promote growth in relatively advanced regions, while leaving 
growth almost unaffected in poorer regions.
4
One reason for the scarcity of recent empirical studies addressing these issues is the 
lack of sufficiently disaggregated FDI data. In addition, it continues to be disputed how 
to measure FDI in order to capture growth effects. According to Blonigen and Wang 
(2005, p. 234), “theory would suggest that FDI stock is the appropriate measure of FDI.” 
Caves (1996, p. 235-236) takes the opposite view: While “no overall theoretical 
prediction connects the stock of foreign investment in the LDC to the rate at which its 
 
exactly the opposite conclusion when employing the same methodology, but using quarterly data for 
1991-2000 in their earlier working paper version.   
2 Studies accounting for the possibility that the relationship between FDI and growth may be bi-directional 
include: Dua and Rashid (1998), Chakraborty and Basu (2002), Bhat et al. (2004), Kumar and Pradhan 
(2005), Herzer et al. (2006), and Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008). 
3 For instance, foreign companies in the software industry are said to operate as “export enclaves” (Kumar 
(2003), p. 27). 
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national income grows”, …, “an inflow of MNE capital, of course, enlarges the rate of 
growth as it affects gross domestic investment.” Most reasonably perhaps, both FDI 
flows and stocks are flawed measures as economic effects in the host country stem from 
FDI-related activities such as sales, employment and R&D (Lipsey (2002), 
Mayer-Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2005)). The widespread use of flow data in recent 
cross-study studies on the growth effects of FDI, including Blonigen and Wang (2005), 
is largely due to data constraints with respect to FDI-related activities in the host country. 
While this limitation also applies to the present study, we make use of an unpublished 
database providing disaggregated information on various aspects of FDI in India that the 
previous literature has hardly addressed.   
 
 
3.  WHAT  THE  DATA  CAN(NOT)  TELL? 
 
We draw on a detailed account of FDI approvals in India during the period 
1991-2005. By using most recent FDI data, we also take into account that earlier 
findings may no longer apply, considering that India’s reform program of 1991 has 
changed considerably the rules and conditions under which FDI operates in the country. 
Restrictive FDI and trade regimes are widely believed to have seriously impeded higher 
FDI inflows until the 1990s, even though some FDI and trade restrictions had been 
relaxed in the mid-1980s already (Balasubramanyam and Mahambare (2003)).   
The economic reforms constituted a break with the dirigisme of the past. The 
removal of controls over FDI represented the reform element most obviously suited to 
stimulate FDI in India. The list of FDI projects placed under the automatic approval 
route was progressively expanded during the 1990s (Singh (2005)). Performance 
requirements such as export obligations were gradually dismantled. New sectors (e.g., 
mining, financial services, telecommunication, etc.) were opened up to FDI and foreign 
majority holdings were allowed in various industries (Kumar (2003)). Full foreign 
ownership was allowed in most manufacturing industries. The relaxation of ownership 
restrictions is not only likely to have induced more FDI; at the same time, the incentives 
of foreign investors to transfer modern technologies were strengthened in this way.
5
The lowering of trade barriers constituted another cornerstone of the reform 
program. For instance, the highest import tariff rate dwindled from 355 percent in 
1990/91 to 25 percent in 2003/04 (Panarariya (2005)). Principally, lower trade barriers 
have ambiguous effects on FDI. On the one hand, import liberalization weakened 
previous incentives to use FDI as a tariff-jumping device, i.e., serve protected Indian 
 
5 Athreye and Kapur (2001) note that, according to surveys conducted in the early 1990s, almost half of 
foreign direct investors did not transfer up-to-date technologies to India. Kumar and Aggarwal (2005) find 
that foreign companies were more inclined to undertake R&D in India in response to the economic 
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markets by local production. On the other hand, import liberalization strengthened the 
incentives to use India as an export platform and a cost effective location for 
intermediate production. It should be noted in this context that import licensing of 
intermediate inputs and capital goods was largely abolished (Panagariya (2005)). By 
encouraging a better alignment of FDI inflows with India’s comparative advantage, the 
chances of India should have improved to benefit from FDI-induced technical and 
knowledge spillovers.
6  
According to Sachs et al. (2002), the reform-mindedness of Indian states has 
rendered them more attractive to FDI. Some observers have doubted, however, that 
economic reforms went far enough to remove the distinct anti-export bias of India’s 
trade policy and, thus, induce types of FDI that may have more favorable growth effects 
(Balasubramanyam and Mahambare (2003), Fischer (2002)).
7 Moreover, factor and 
product market distortions persisted at least in parts of India. Aggarwal (2005) finds that 
stricter labor market rigidities at the state level discouraged FDI in 1991-2001, 
especially in the case of export-oriented FDI. 
To address the determinants and effects of FDI since the reform program of 1991, 
we use detailed information on the number and amount of approved FDI projects, the 
share of foreign equity, the state and district where FDI projects take place, and the 
country of origin.
8 Moreover, the database offers information on planned activities 
which allows us to classify FDI projects according to broad sectors (primary, secondary 
and tertiary). Finally, the database also covers technology licensing arrangements 
(so-called technical cases) that do not involve FDI inflows. 
Admittedly, approved FDI may deviate considerably from realized FDI. Figure 1 
indicates that only about one third of approved FDI amounts were realized in the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, this gap does not seriously constrain the subsequent analysis. The increase 
in realized FDI was largely in line with the increase in approved FDI until recently. 
Consequently, the analysis of the effects of booming FDI on subsequent economic 
development in Section 5 is unlikely to be distorted by using approval data. Only 
recently, the development of realized and approved FDI diverged. Approved FDI 
dropped substantially after its peak in the late 1990s. This may be due to changes in the 
approval procedure. Given that the list of FDI projects placed under the automatic 
approval route has been progressively expanded, the database on approved FDI may 
 
6 Gupta (2005) argues that India’s earlier import substitution strategy impaired the economic benefits to be 
derived from FDI. Bhat et al. (2004) suspect economic spillovers to have remained weak due to a lack of 
local skills.   
7 Agarwal (2001) suspects FDI in India to be still domestic market seeking. 
8 The data were kindly made available by the Department of Industrial Promotion and Policy (DIPP) of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. While the database covers the period 1991-2005, we do not use the data 
for 1991 and 1992 in the subsequent sections. Specific information on FDI projects, notably the state in 
which projects are located, is largely lacking for these years. PETER NUNNENKAMP AND RUDI STRACKE  60 
understate actual FDI inflows in recent years. This is even though automatic route 
approvals are included in the database until October 2004, according to information 
received from India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry. It should be noted, however, 
that the data on realized FDI suffer from inconsistency, too. Most importantly, it is only 
since 2000 that the Reserve Bank of India offers a revised series of FDI inflows that 
includes reinvested earnings and debt transactions between related entities (to be 

























































Source: Unpublished database on FDI approvals, Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2007), Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI) (2006).   
 




Moreover, differences in the level of FDI approvals and realized FDI are unlikely to 
significantly affect our results since the subsequent analysis is largely based on FDI 
shares, e.g., the share of a particular region in approved FDI in all India. Accordingly, 
results would only be distorted if approved and realized FDI differed to a considerably 
larger extent in one region than in another region.
9 Finally, we focus on the number of 
approved FDI projects, rather than the amounts of approved FDI. The former measure is 
 
9 Note also that the analysis of FDI shares is unaffected by missing data for FDI projects automatically 
approved most recently, unless missing cases are distributed unevenly across states, districts or sectors. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POST-REFORM INDIA  61 
unaffected by the gap between approved and realized amounts for particular FDI 
projects. 
In addition to overall FDI, we take into account that the sectoral structure of FDI in 
India has changed dramatically since the early 1990s. Figure 2 portrays the development 
of the share of three major sectors in the overall number of FDI cases. Very similar to 
what Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008) observed for (realized) FDI stocks, there is a 
clear trend towards FDI in services which accounted for about 60 percent of all 
approved FDI cases in recent years. In sharp contrast, FDI in manufacturing clearly 
dominated in the first half of the 1990s. FDI in the primary sector remained marginal 
throughout the period of observation. We employ the sector-wise FDI data, in addition 
to overall FDI, when assessing major FDI determinants in the subsequent section and 
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Source: Unpublished database on FDI approvals. 
 
Figure 2.    Sector-wise Structure of FDI Approvals in India, 1991-2005 
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4.    WHERE DID FDI GO IN POST-REFORM INDIA? 
 
4.1.    Regional Concentration of FDI 
 
FDI flows to India are heavily concentrated in a few states.
10 Measured by the 
amount of approved FDI in 2001-2005, almost 26 percent of overall FDI was located in 
Maharashtra, followed by Delhi (13.6 percent), Karnataka (11.3 percent), Gujarat (8.3 
percent) and Tamil Nadu (6.3 percent).
11 The concentration of FDI in these top-5 states 
was still more pronounced with respect to the number of FDI projects (74 percent versus 
65 percent).   
However, these simple concentration measures offer limited insights at best. FDI has 
to be “normalized” in order to reflect the states’ attractiveness to FDI. In the following, 
we relate FDI to the population of states to control for their size.
12 FDI per capita for 
each state is then related to FDI per capita for all India to reflect a state’s relative 
attractiveness. Moreover, the interesting question in the context of the present paper is 
whether the concentration in a few states has become stronger in the course of economic 
reforms. Therefore, we calculate the above measure for three time intervals (i.e., 
1993-1996, 1997-2000, and 2001-2005) to determine possible trends. 
We focus on the number of approved FDI projects (“FDI cases” for short) in the 
remainder of this section. Unlike the distribution of the amount of FDI, the distribution 
of FDI cases is not affected by single, exceptionally large FDI approvals.
13 Nevertheless, 
the amount and the number of FDI projects are strongly correlated across Indian states. 




10 Whenever the data situation allows us to do so, we consider all Indian states, including Union Territories as 
well as Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and Chhattisgarh (which were part of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya 
Pradesh, respectively, up to 2000). However, in several instances we had to refer to the older state boundaries 
for consistency reasons. For similar findings on the concentration of FDI in India, see Aggarwal (2005), Basu 
(2005), and Purfield (2006). 
11 These shares in FDI in all India are understated somewhat as the state is not indicated for about 15 percent 
of approved FDI in 2001-2005. For the whole period of observation (1993-2005), the state in which FDI is 
located remains unknown for 27.6 percent of approved amounts and 17.4 percent of approved cases. 
12 Population figures refer to census years closest to the beginning of the period under consideration, e.g., 
1991 for the period 1993-1996 and 2001 for the period 2001-2005. However, we refer to estimated 
population data below whenever census years and the initial year of the period under consideration deviate by 
more than two years. 
13 For instance, Delhi attracted one project of US$ 1.3 billion in 1995. This project boosted Delhi’s share in 
FDI amounts approved in all India in the period 1993-1996 by more than five percentage points to 19.1 
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Figure 3.    Relative Attractiveness of Indian States to FDI 
 
 
For a start, we compare the attractiveness of Indian states to FDI, measured in the 
way just described, for the whole period of observation. Most of the Union Territories 
clearly stand out in that FDI per capita was between 5.3 to 20.8 times higher than the 
average for India as a whole (Figure 3).
14 This is not surprising as Union Territories are 
typically cities without a less developed, rural hinterland. Another relatively small group 
of five states attracted significantly more FDI per capita than India as a whole (Goa, 
Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu). In sharp contrast, 20 states appear 
to be fairly unattractive to FDI, with ratios of FDI per capita below 0.5 and sometimes 
close to zero. 
Next, we assess whether traditionally attractive states have become still more 
attractive in the aftermath of economic reforms (Figure 4). Concerning the Union 
 
14 Exceptions are Lakshadweep as well as Andaman and Nicobar, which both are small islands far off the 
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Territories, the picture is ambiguous: some of them managed to increase their relative 
share over time, whereas others failed to do so. Among the remaining Indian states, it 
was mainly the attractive states (except for Haryana) which further increased their FDI 
inflows in the aftermath of reforms. By contrast, out of the group of states with ratios 
well below the national average, only Kerala improved its position steadily, though just 





Figure 4.  Trends  in  FDI  Concentration 
 
 
Taken together, India is a highly divided country with respect to the distribution of 
FDI across states. FDI is concentrated in two regions, namely in the area around Delhi 
and in the southern part of India, especially along the west coast. The region around 
Delhi seems to have lost some of its importance, whereas the south-western part of India FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POST-REFORM INDIA  65 
further increased its share in total FDI. The increasing concentration of FDI may imply 
that many large states and, therefore, a large part of the Indian population were left 
unaffected by booming FDI in the post-reform period. Before returning to this question 
in Section 5, we will re-assess the concentration issue at the level of districts within 
selected states, and discuss major factors that may be underlying the uneven distribution 
of FDI. 
The distribution of FDI within major states is portrayed in Table 1. We focus on 
large states at a considerably different stage of economic development, proxied by initial 
per-capita income in 1993.
15 The concentration on the single most important district as 
well as the top-3 districts is based on the number of FDI projects located in these 
districts. In four out of the eleven states listed in Table 1, the most important district 
accounted for more than 60 percent of all FDI projects the respective state attracted in 
1993-2005. Most notably, almost 90 percent of FDI projects in Karnataka went to 
Bangalore - followed by Kolkata in West Bengal, Chennai in Tamil Nadu, and Mumbai 
in Maharashtra.   
At first sight, the concentration on the top district appears to be much weaker in less 
developed states such as Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. However, 
the concentration is fairly similar in richer and poorer states once the share of top 
districts in FDI cases is related to the population living in these districts. For instance, 
the concentration on the top district in Uttar Pradesh was only slightly less than that in 
Maharashtra when FDI shares are related to population shares. In Rajasthan this relative 
measure reveals a somewhat higher concentration of FDI on the top district than in 
Karnataka. The relative concentration on the top district turns out to be particularly high 
in Kerala (23.3), Madhya Pradesh (22.9) and Bihar (21.8), even though the share of FDI 
projects per se was lowest in Madhya Pradesh, and the average per-capita income was 
lowest by far in Bihar. 
The high concentration of FDI on a few economic centers within the states under 
consideration is corroborated when looking at the top-3 districts. With few exceptions, 
the top-3 districts attracted more than two thirds of the states’ total number of FDI 
projects in 1993-2005. In Karnataka, the three districts (urban and rural Bangalore plus 
Mysore) accounted for almost all FDI projects. And again, Madhya Pradesh is not really 
an exception: Rather, the concentration on the top-3 districts was particularly 
pronounced in this state when taking into account that more than half of all FDI projects 







15 Except Kerala, all states listed in Table 1 have a population of more than 40 million. PETER NUNNENKAMP AND RUDI STRACKE  66 
Table 1.    Selected States: Concentration of FDI (number of projects) at the District 
Level





Maharashtra (12200)  60.1 (3.4)  85.9 (19.3) 
Gujarat (9800)  32.4 (11.5)  65.7 (21.4) 
Tamil Nadu (9000)  63.8 (7.0)  86.7 (18.4) 
Kerala (8000)  44.3 (1.9)  78.0 (5.4) 
Karnataka (7800)  89.3 (12.4)  97.6 (20.9) 
Andhra Pradesh (7400)  57.0 (4.9)  76.2 (13.0) 
West Bengal (6800)  70.2 (5.7)  82.1 (26.3) 
Madhya Pradesh (6600)  22.9 (1.0)  50.9 (2.8) 
Rajasthan (6200)  31.6 (3.2)  68.4 (6.3) 
Uttar Pradesh (5100)  30.7 (2.0)  68.5 (4.5) 
Bihar (3000)  52.4 (2.4)  83.3 (10.9) 
Notes:
 a Total number of projects in the particular state excludes projects for which the location at the district 
level is not disclosed. The share of undisclosed projects ranges from 2.8 percent (Karnataka) to 14.3 percent 
(Bihar). 
b States ranked according to per-capita income in 1993 (as given in parentheses). 
c In parenthesis is a 
percent of the state’s population in 2001 
Sources: Unpublished database on approvals, Central Statistical Organisation (var. iss.). 
 
 
4.2.  Major  FDI  Determinants 
 
In this section, we present regression results to provide insights on major factors 
underlying the distribution of FDI approvals across Indian states in 1993-2005. This also 
offers indirect evidence with respect to the chances of less advanced states to improve 
their attractiveness to FDI and, thereby, foster economic growth. As noted by the World 
Bank (2004), differences in business conditions are far more pronounced within India 
than the much discussed differences between all India and competing China. At the 
same time, the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment in 2004 suggests that 
those states attracting the bulk of FDI are characterized by better business conditions. 
The dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of FDI 
cases in a particular state. We treat zero observations for FDI cases in two ways: in the 
preferred specification, we set the log of FDI equal to minus one when a state had no 
FDI case in the period under consideration.
16 The advantage of this approach is that we 
do not lose any observations for the FDI variable. Alternatively, we dropped zero 
observations for FDI in order to assess whether the results depend on the above choice. 
 
16 While this is a somewhat arbitrary choice, the resulting difference in the logged dependent variable 
between FDI cases=1 and FDI cases=0 (-1) is similar to the corresponding difference between FDI cases=2 
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As concerns the possible driving forces underlying the distribution of FDI, we 
account for various factors that have been used in the cross-country literature on FDI 
determinants (see, e.g., Chakrabarti (2001)). The focus is on structural characteristics of 
Indian states that may impede their attractiveness to FDI in the long run. Notably, we 
include indicators on the economic development of Indian states, their size, the quality 
of infrastructure, and the level of education. Whenever possible, the data on the 
indicators used refer to the initial year of the two sub-periods, 1993-1998 and 1999-2005, 
in order to minimize any reverse causation that might exist.
17
Possible FDI determinants considered in all estimations include the per-capita 
income and the population of states, population density, financial development, as well 
as a dummy variable set equal to one for Union Territories. Population is included as an 
explanatory variable to control for the size of states. As concerns education-related 
variables, we enter either the literacy rate or student enrolment in higher than primary 
education. Likewise, we consider either roads or electricity as an additional indicator of 
the quality of infrastructure in Indian states. All variables are logged. 
Even though variables related to education and infrastructure enter alternatively in 
the regressions, we may still encounter multicollinearity problems. The per-capita 
income of states is highly correlated with literacy rates (0.69) and financial development 
(0.81); the same applies to the correlation between population density and roads (0.85). 
In principle, multicollinearity could be mitigated by first regressing specific 
determinants on per-capita income and then using the residuals in the FDI equation. We 
refrained from doing so for several reasons. In the case of population density and roads, 
it would be somewhat arbitrary to decide on the variable for which to take residuals. 
Moreover, in several instances (see below for details), both variables turned out to be 
significant even though they are correlated. 
The regressions are performed by pooling the observations for the two sub-periods 
of 1993-1998 and 1999-2005. We include a time dummy, with D=1 for the second 
sub-period, in order to account for the structural break in our dependent variable 
resulting from liberalized approval procedures (see Section 3).
18 Depending on missing 
values for explanatory variables, we end up with 43-52 observations. 
The results summarized in Table 2 clearly show that more advanced Indian states 
attract more FDI. In all estimations with overall FDI as the dependent variable, the 
coefficient of per-capita income (LN_PCI) is significant at the one percent level. At the 
same time, the effect of per-capita income on the number of FDI cases is quantitatively 
 
17 For some indicators, data are lacking for 1993 and 1999. In these cases, we chose the closest year available. 
See Appendix table for exact definitions and summary statistics of state characteristics used in the regression 
analysis. 
18 It would be interesting to interact the time dummy with possible FDI determinants to assess whether they 
have become more or less important over time. However, the limited number of observations renders this 
exercise rather futile. PETER NUNNENKAMP AND RUDI STRACKE  68 
 
important, with a one percent increase in per-capita income being associated with an 
increase in the number of FDI cases of about three percent. The same applies to 
population (LN_POPULATION): All coefficients are highly significant and positive as 
expected, consistently showing an elasticity of about 1.4-1.5. 
The coefficient of the dummy variable for Union Territories (UNION_TERR) 
remains statistically insignificant. In some contrast to Sachs et al. (2002), according to 
whom FDI located mainly in urbanized states, more densely populated states no longer 
attract more FDI once other FDI determinants are controlled for. In some regressions, 
the coefficient of LN_POP_DENSITY is even significantly negative, though only 
weakly so. This may suggest that foreign investors prefer less congested regions once 
the stage of economic development and the quality of infrastructure are controlled for. 
The time dummy accounting for the break in the time series on FDI approvals is 
consistently negative and highly significant. This is not surprising given the above noted 
liberalization of approval procedures.   
The treatment of zero observations for FDI cases does not affect our results. The 
significance as well as the size of coefficients is hardly affected when comparing 
columns (1) and (2) in Table 2. Hence, it is only for our preferred model with zero 
observations included in the way described above, that we report different specifications 
with respect to variables related to infrastructure and education as well as estimations 
with sector-specific FDI as the dependent variable. 
The evidence for the indicators related to infrastructure and education turns out to be 
ambiguous. This is in line with the previous literature where the role of infrastructure as 
a determinant of FDI in India has remained disputed. While the World Bank (2004) 
claims that deficient infrastructure represents an important bottleneck to investment even 
in relatively advanced states such as Maharashtra and Gujarat, Chakravorty (2003) finds 
that infrastructure had little influence in determining the location or quantity of new 
industrial investment. The infrastructure index used by Singh and Srinivasan (2004) is 
only weakly correlated with FDI per capita approved in 1991-2001. 
Our regression results suggest that the impact of infrastructure on FDI depends on 
the specific indicator chosen. FDI is more strongly correlated with transport 
infrastructure, as measured by the length of roads (LN_ROADS), than with the supply of 
electricity (LN_ELECTRICITY). The coefficient of roads is significant in all three 
estimations for overall FDI including this variable (at the 10 percent level or better) with 
an elasticity of 0.6-0.7. Electricity enters significantly (at the 10 percent level) in column 
(4), while it remains insignificant in column (5). The weaker evidence for electricity 
seems to be due to the shortcomings of the indicator used here (i.e., the supply of kW 
per capita) as well as the reduced number of available observations.
19
19 Survey results of the World Bank (2004) suggest that the availability and the cost of electricity are among the 
most important determinants of where companies locate. Kochhar et al. (2006) use transmission and distribution 
losses of state level electricity boards, in order to account for generated power that is not paid for. O U R N A L   O F   E C O N O M I C   D E V E L O P M E N T                                
 
Table 2.    FDI Determinants at the State Level: Regression Results
a
 (1)  (2)
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Adjusted R-square  0.88 0.86 0.87 0.91 0.91  0.62  0.89  0.82 
SE of Regression  0.93 0.92 0.99 0.80 0.80  1.07  0.91  1.06 
F-statistic  48.54 35.16 43.89 60.98 56.22  11.26  50.15  30.01 
Number of Observations  51 47 52 46 53  51  51  51 
Notes: 
a Standard errors in parentheses; 
***,
**,
* significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
bIn contrast to all other columns: zero observations for FDI 
cases dropped; see text for details. 
Sources: Unpublished database on FDI approvals, Observer Research Foundation (var. iss.), Central Statistical Organisation (var. iss.). 
JJ O U R N A L   O F   E C O N O M I C   D E V E L O P M E N T                                
The coefficient of LN_BANK, our indicator of financial development of Indian 
states, remains insignificant in all estimations reported in Table 2. Nonetheless, it might 
be unwarranted to conclude that financial development does not play any role in 
attracting FDI. Respondents to the World Bank’s recent investment climate assessment 
often rated access to finance to be a major obstacle to business operations. Furthermore, 
financial development and FDI turn out to be strongly correlated across Indian states in 
bivariate correlations, suggesting that the insignificance of LN_BANK in Table 2 may 
be due to multicollinearity.
20 Note also that in columns (1) and (2), the positive 
coefficient of LN_BANK just fails to pass the 10 percent level of significance.   
Most strikingly, we do not find that better education attracts FDI in Indian states. 
Rather, higher literacy rates (LN_LITERACY) are associated with less FDI according to 
columns (1) and (2). This implausible result seems to be driven by some exceptional 
cases of extremely small states and Union Territories. The Andaman & Nicobar Islands 
as well as Mizoram (with populations of less than one million) report literacy rates well 
above 80 percent, while the number of FDI cases was either zero or one. Once these 
outliers are not included (as in column (5) because data on electricity are lacking), 
literacy turns insignificant, which is reasonable if FDI in India increasingly draws on 
more skilled labor.   
Student enrolment (LN_STUDENTS) also remains insignificant. Regrettably, we 
cannot differentiate between medium and higher levels of education in the regression 
analysis.
21 This differentiation is possible, however, in bivariate correlations performed 
separately for the first sub-period 1993-1998 and the second sub-period 1999-2005. The 
results (not shown) suggest that the correlation between FDI and student enrolment at 
higher levels of education is significantly positive, and has become stronger recently. 
This might imply that FDI in India increasingly depends on the availability of skilled 
local labor. 
In columns (6)-(8), we replicate the estimation of the basic specification in column 
(1) with sector-specific FDI cases in manufacturing, services and the primary sector 
(instead of the overall number of FDI cases) as alternative dependent variables. The 
findings on various FDI determinants are surprisingly robust for sector-specific FDI. 
This applies especially when comparing the results for FDI in manufacturing and in the 
services sector. In both sectors, the per-capita income of Indian states as well as their 
size (measured by population) enters significantly positive at the one percent level. 
 
20 Bivariate correlations are not reported here in any detail, but are available from the earlier working paper 
version of this article (http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/foreign-direct-investment-in 
-post-reform-india-likely-to-work-wonders-for-regional-development-1/kap1375.pdf). The working paper 
also presents correlations with respect to telecommunications, the inclusion of which in the regressions is 
prevented by data constraints. 
21 This is because we pool two sub-periods for which the data on student enrolment beyond the primary level 
are not comparable due to changes in the classification. 
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States with better transport infrastructure also attract more FDI in both sectors. Most of 
the other coefficients remain statistically insignificant - as was the case for overall FDI. 
The pattern for FDI in the primary sector differs in two respects. The size and the 
significance of the coefficient on per-capita income are less than for other sectors, and 
transport infrastructure turns out to be insignificant. These peculiarities are not 
surprising as the attraction of raw materials to foreign investors tends to dominate over 
concerns related to the stage of economic development and the quality of infrastructure 
in the host state. 
All in all, the regression analysis supports the view that more advanced Indian states 
had considerably better chances to attract FDI.   
 
 
5.    FDI AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF INDIAN STATES 
 
5.1.    Overall FDI, Growth and Poverty Alleviation 
 
As noted in Section 2,  previous studies typically failed to find a positive link 
between inward FDI and economic growth. However, earlier findings may no longer 
apply if the changed policy environment has resulted in a fundamental shift in the 
behavior of foreign investors and, thus, in the benefits India may derive from FDI. Based 
on FDI approvals (in per-capita terms) in 14 major states in 1991-2001, Singh and 
Srinivasan (2004, p. 33) indeed find a significantly positive impact of FDI on per-capita 
income growth at the state level.   
Similar to Singh and Srinivasan (2004), we do not attempt to estimate a well 
specified growth equation in this section. Rather, we proceed in several steps: For a start, 
we perform bivariate correlations between different FDI measures on the one hand, and 
growth and poverty-related performance variables on the other hand. Subsequently, we 
account for initial income and the FDI intensity at the state level to assess whether FDI 
may have helped poorer states to catch up with richer states. The possible problem of 
reverse causation running from growth to FDI is mitigated by employing FDI measures 
for the period 1993-1998 while performance variables extend to the more recent past.   
Table 3 reports the correlation results for three FDI-related measures: In addition to 
our preferred measure of the number of FDI projects, we use the amount of approved 
FDI as well as the number of so-called technical cases (i.e., technology licensing 
arrangements). All measures are in per-capita terms of the states’ population, relative to 
the Indian average. 
With few exceptions, the correlations turn out to be significant at the five percent 
level or better. Both the number of FDI cases and the number of technical cases are not 
only associated with higher per-capita income growth over the whole period of 
observation (1994-2005), but also with reduced poverty (measured by the percentage 
change in the share of people below the poverty line). Most strikingly perhaps, FDI and 
technical cases are correlated with poverty alleviation in rural areas, too. This appears to PETER NUNNENKAMP AND RUDI STRACKE  72 
be in contrast to the view that the rural population was hardly affected by FDI in India 
(Singh (2005), p. 5). Given that FDI tends to locate primarily in more developed areas 
(Section 4), the effects on rural poverty may be rather indirect, e.g., by inducing poor 
workers to migrate to urban centers. Earlier studies found net migration from poor to 
richer regions in India to respond only weakly to income differentials (Cashin and Sahay 
(1996), see also Sachs et al. (2002)). During the reform period, however, migration rates 
increased and “medium to long-term migration seems to be responding to the signal of 
economic opportunities” (Mahendra Dev and Evenson (2003), p. 20). Empirical 
evidence available for Mexico suggests that this recent development may have helped 
rural poverty reduction through FDI-induced employment opportunities in more 
advanced regions (Aroca and Maloney (2005)). 
The data situation does not allow testing the robustness of the poverty-related results 
by considering only the recent past, in order to mitigate problems of reverse causation.
22 
However, such a test can be performed with respect to performance in terms of growth. 
As shown in Table 3, the results weaken considerably once we correlate the FDI-related 
measures with subsequent growth in 1999-2005, but the coefficients remain significantly 
positive at the ten percent level or better except for technical cases. 
In summary, the correlations indicate that FDI may well have supported economic 
growth and poverty alleviation at the level of Indian states. It remains open to question, 
however, whether favorable effects were confined to a few states which were fairly 
advanced already.   
 
 
Table 3.    FDI, Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation
a: 
Correlation Results across Indian States
b 
Per-capital Income Growth  Change in Poverty, 1994-2001  FDI Measure 
1994-2005 1999-2005  Total  Urban  Rural 
Number of FDI 
Cases 
0.70*** 0.31*  -0.46**  -0.56***  -0.53*** 
FDI Amounts  0.66***  0.39**  -0.16  -0.25  -0.40** 
Number of 
Technical Cases
0.62*** 0.24  -0.46**  -0.52***  -0.44** 
Notes: 
a Percentage change of the share of people below the poverty line; all FDI measures are in per-capita 
terms, relative to the Indian average. 
*, 
**, and 
*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
b Lakshadweep, Daman & Diu, Mizoram as well as Dadra & Nagar Haveli are missing due to 
lack of data. 
Sources: Unpublished database on FDI approvals, Reserve Bank of India (2006). 
 
 
22 This is even though Dev and Ravi (2007) present data on changes in poverty-related indicators for the two 
sub-periods 1993-2000 and 1999-2005, respectively. However, these data are available for 19 states only. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POST-REFORM INDIA  73 
5.2.    Specific Categories of FDI and Growth 
 
Before returning to this issue, we explore the possibility that the growth effects of 
FDI may differ depending on (i) where FDI is coming from, (ii) in which sector it is 
taking place, and (iii) the extent to which local Indian partners participate in FDI 
projects (joint ventures). In order to assess whether the structure of FDI matters, we 
replicate the above FDI-growth correlations for specific categories of FDI. As before, 
FDI is defined in per-capita terms for the period 1993-1998. The analysis is restricted to 
our preferred FDI measure, i.e., the number of FDI projects. Growth rates are for the 
period 1999-2005, excluding Nagaland and Tripura.
23
To begin with, we use the information on the source of FDI projects that is included 
in the database on FDI approvals. The proposition that FDI effects may differ between 
source countries goes back to Kojima’s (1978) claim that Japanese FDI in developing 
countries is distinct in that it fosters trade and economic development.
24 More recently, 
Harzing and Sorge (2003) argued that the source country of FDI matters as the strategies 
of multinational companies tend to be shaped by market conditions, business systems 
and the institutional background prevailing at home. Therefore, we calculate the 
correlation with growth for selected groups of foreign direct investors that contributed 
significantly to overall FDI projects in all India. The most important source countries 
are: the United Kingdom (16.3 percent of all FDI projects in 1993-2005), the United 
States (10.8), Germany (9.8), and Japan (6.2). In addition, we consider FDI projects 
undertaken by non-resident Indians (NRI), which the database identifies as a separate 
FDI category; NRI accounted for six percent of all FDI projects in 1993-2005.
25
As concerns the four major home countries of foreign investors, there is at best weak 
evidence supporting the view that FDI from particular sources is superior to FDI from 
other sources. The correlations with growth are somewhat stronger for FDI from Japan 
and the United Kingdom than for FDI from Germany and the United States (Table 4). 
However, the correlation remains significant at the five percent level even for the two 
latter sources. This result is hardly surprisingly once it is taken into account that the 
 
23 The differences between major sources of FDI as well as the sectors in which FDI takes place are hardly 
affected by the treatment of these two outliers, while all correlations tend to be weaker if Nagaland and 
Tripura are included. 
24 The analysis across the host countries of Japanese and US FDI by Kumar (2000) lends some support to this 
view; Japanese companies are shown to move a larger part of the value chain to the host countries. In the 
Indian context, Banga (2003) shows that the export effects of FDI differed between the home countries of 
foreign investors. In contrast to the Kojima hypothesis, however, it turned out that FDI from the United States 
had a positive impact on the export intensity of non-traditional export industries, whereas Japanese FDI had 
not. 
25 Taken together, the four source countries under consideration plus NRI accounted for about half of all FDI 
projects in 1993-2005. Their joint contribution to total approved FDI amounts was slightly less (44 percent). PETER NUNNENKAMP AND RUDI STRACKE  74 
location choices of foreign investors based in these four countries closely resemble each 
other.
26 If a superior type of FDI exists at all, it tends to come from non-resident Indians. 
FDI by non-resident Indians is less closely aligned with other sources of FDI in terms of 
location choices.
27 One may also suspect FDI by non-resident Indians to promote 
growth through stronger linkages with the local economy. 
The results for FDI in specific sectors support the widely held belief that 
resource-seeking FDI in the primary sector is unlikely to be associated with significant 
growth effects (e.g., Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008)). Most obviously, this is 
because FDI in India’s primary sector plays a marginal role in quantitative terms. In 
1993-1998, FDI projects in the primary sector accounted for just four percent of all FDI 
projects. In addition, growth-promoting spillovers of FDI to local companies and 
workers tend to be relatively weak in the primary sector (UNCTAD (2001), p. 138).   
 
 
Table 4.    Structural Characteristics of FDI and Economic Growth: 
Correlation Results across Indian States 
FDI characteristics  Sub-category  Per-capita income growth, 1999-2005 
Source of FDI  Germany  0.43
**
 Japan  0.51
***
 United  Kingdom 0.50
***
 United  States  0.42
**
 Non-resident  Indians  0.55
***
Sector Primary  0.01 
 Secondary  0.39
**
 Tertiary  0.48
***
Foreign equity share  Foreign minority  0.41
**
 Foreign  majority 0.52
***





*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Sources: Unpublished database on FDI approvals, Reserve Bank of India (2006). 
 
 
More interestingly, the correlation with growth is at least as strong for FDI in the 
tertiary sector as it is for FDI in the secondary sector. FDI in Indian manufacturing was 
dominated by relatively (physical and human) capital intensive items such as transport 
equipment and chemicals, whereas labor intensive items such as textiles and leather 
 
26 The pair-wise correlation between FDI from the four countries across Indian states in 1993-1998 ranges 
from 0.79 (Japan - United States) to 0.98 (Germany - United Kingdom). 
27 For instance, the correlation between FDI from NRI and that from Germany amounts to just 0.56; the 
highest correlation is that with Japanese FDI (0.69).   FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POST-REFORM INDIA  75 
goods rank far down the list of approved FDI provided by the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry (2007). This pattern suggests that FDI hardly drew on India’s comparative 
advantage in labor intensive manufacturing industries, which may have prevented 
stronger growth-promoting spillovers in this sector (see Section 2). By contrast, 
Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008) found FDI in Indian manufacturing to be superior 
to FDI in services in terms of growth effects. However, the panel cointegration approach 
of these authors does not cover the state level, which is the focus of the present paper. 
Across Indian states, the location choices of foreign investors were fairly similar for FDI 
in the secondary and tertiary sector.
28
Finally, the correlation between FDI and growth is only weakly affected when FDI 
projects are differentiated according to the degree of foreign equity participation. All 
three sub-categories of FDI are significantly correlated with growth. It is thus difficult to 
decide whether the liberalization of foreign equity restrictions helped positive growth 
effects by improving the incentives to transfer up-to-date technologies, or whether 
spillovers to local joint venture partners were impaired in this way. Possibly, these two 
opposing effects canceled out each other. It fits into this reasoning that the correlation 
with growth is somewhat stronger for FDI projects with majority foreign equity shares: 
While the incentives for technology transfers tend to be stronger for this sub-category in 
comparison to projects with foreign minority shares, majority-owned projects may have 
offered better chances of spillovers than wholly foreign owned projects. However, the 
weaker correlation shown for wholly foreign owned projects may also result from the 




5.3.    FDI, Initial Income and Growth 
 
We now return to the question whether positive growth effects of FDI may have 
helped poorer Indian states to catch up economically with richer states. Several studies 
suggest that income discrepancies have widened in the post-reform period. For example, 
Sachs et al. (2002) find a tendency towards divergence across Indian states.
30 Kochhar 
 
28 The correlation between FDI in the secondary sector and FDI in the tertiary sector is 0.64. By contrast, FDI 
in the primary sector is only weakly correlated with FDI in other sectors (0.33 and 0.29 with FDI in the 
secondary and tertiary sector, respectively). 
29 The share of wholly foreign owned projects in all projects (excluding projects for which the foreign equity 
share is unknown) increased considerably from 8 percent in 1993 to 35 percent in 1998. Nevertheless, 
projects with foreign minority shares were clearly dominant during the period 1993-1998; on average, they 
accounted for more than half of all FDI projects, compared to 29 and 19 percent for majority-owned and 
wholly foreign owned projects, respectively. 
30 Chakravorty (2003) uses district data on industrial location and finds inter-regional divergence, but 
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et al. (2006), Purfield (2006) as well as Veeramani and Goldar (2006) all refer to 
growing concerns that economic progress is leaving some states behind. Economic 
reforms have changed the nature of central government control of the economy in a way 
that increases the potential for greater disparities across states (Singh and Srinivasan 
(2004), p. 30). Likewise, Kochhar et al. (2006, p. 36) argue that state-level capabilities 
as well as state-level policies and institutions matter more since the 1990s, with the 
center no longer enforcing inter-state equity, divergences in growth rates between states 
increased. 
According to Purfield (2006), labor and capital flows have done little to close 
income gaps. Nevertheless, it remains open to debate whether FDI has contributed to 
divergence across Indian states, rather than helping convergence. In Section 4, we 
provided some indirect evidence pointing in the former direction by showing that FDI 
located primarily in richer states. In the following, we address this issue in a more direct 
way. First, we classify all Indian states (including Union Territories) into two groups of 
relatively rich and poor states, taking the median of average per-capita income in the 
initial year 1993 as the dividing line.
31 Both groups are then further divided into two 
sub-groups of relatively high and low FDI intensity. The criterion applied is the number 
of FDI projects per head of the state’s population (relative to the national average) in 
1993-1998. Hence, we end up with four sub-groups of eight states each.
32 Second, we 
calculate the average annual growth rate of per-capita income in constant prices for each 
of the four sub-groups during the period 1994-2005 (Table 5).
33
Catching up of relatively poor Indian states would obviously require that their 
average growth rate should have exceeded the average growth rate of the relatively rich 
states. This is not the case: While the difference in average growth rates between poor 
and rich states is marginal in the low FDI category, the substantially higher average 
growth rate of rich states in the high FDI category points to divergence rather than 
convergence.  
More interestingly in the present context, it is only for relatively rich states that a 
higher FDI intensity is associated with a significantly higher growth rate. By contrast, 
the difference in growth rates remains marginal between relatively poor states with a low 
 
31 Lakshadweep, Daman & Diu as well as Dadra & Nagar Haveli are not included because of missing data.   
32 Table 5 lists only seven states in the sub-group with low FDI and high income. In addition, Mizoram 
belongs to this sub-group, but the data situation does not allow meaningful calculation of the annual average 
growth rate in this case. Nevertheless, the results reported in the table are hardly affected if Mizoram is 
included. 
33 Due to incomplete data, growth rates for most recent years could not be calculated for several states. 
Therefore, we checked the robustness of the results reported in Table 5 by limiting the period for which 
annual average growth rates are calculated to 1994-2002. While growth rates turned out to be somewhat 
lower for all sub-groups, the differences in growth rates between sub-groups were hardly affected. 
Considering that we focus on differences here, the results for the shorter period are not presented.   FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POST-REFORM INDIA  77 
FDI intensity and poor states with a high FDI intensity. In other words, FDI does not 
appear to be a decisive factor for the growth prospects of less advanced Indian states. All 
in all, Table 5 appears to be in line with the evidence available for China where FDI has 
contributed to widening income gaps between the prospering coast and the hinterland 
(e.g., Fujita and Hu (2001), Zhang and Zhang (2003)). 
The finding that FDI goes along with widening regional income discrepancies 
between Indian states does not necessarily imply that poor regions would have fared 
better if India had attracted less FDI. This finding invites the conclusion, however, that 
attracting FDI is not sufficient to unleash the potential for catching up of poor regions, 
similar to what has been observed in the cross-country context (Nunnenkamp (2004)). It 
is left to future research whether this conclusion still holds once (i) a finer regional 
disaggregation (at the level of districts) is applied, and (ii) a multivariate analysis is 
performed by controlling for other determinants of growth.   
 
 
Table 5.    Average Annual Growth in Per-capita Income (percent), 1994-2005:   
Groups of Indian States according to Initial Income and FDI Intensity
 
  High FDI, 1993-98  Low FDI, 1993-98 
Low income 1993 
3.87 
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh,
West Bengal, Uttarranchal, 
Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa 
3.61 
Bihar, Assam, Manipur, Jammu 
& Kaschmir, Tripura, Maghalaya, 
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand 
High income 1993 
5.79 
Delhi, Goa, Haryana, 
Maharashtra, Pondicherry, 
Tamil Nadu, Chandigarh, 
Andaman & Nicobar 
3.89 
Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, 
Sikkim, Arunchal Pradesh, 
Nagaland, Gujarat, Punjab 
Sources: Unpublished database on FDI approvals, Reserve Bank of India (2006). 
 
 
6.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a definite answer to the question 
whether booming FDI in post-reform India has helped reduce regional income 
disparities within the country. Rather, we make use of an extremely rich and detailed 
database on FDI approvals since the early 1990s and attempt “to tease out broad patterns, 
and in a variety of ways” (Kochhar et al. (2006), p. 7), mainly by means of descriptive 
statistics and bivariate correlations. 
The available evidence indicates that FDI is likely to widen regional income 
disparity in India. The concentration of FDI in a few Indian states tends to work against PETER NUNNENKAMP AND RUDI STRACKE  78 
favorable FDI effects spreading across the Indian economy. The regional dissemination 
of FDI-induced growth is further impaired by the increasing concentration of FDI at the 
state level since the early 1990s. FDI is heavily concentrated even within Indian states: 
Typically, the three most attractive districts account for more than two thirds of all FDI 
projects located in the state as a whole. Furthermore, the regression analysis of possible 
determinants of FDI reveals that it is fairly difficult for less developed states to induce 
economic catching-up processes by drawing on FDI. Foreign investors strongly prefer 
locations in India that are relatively advanced in terms of per-capita income and 
(transport) infrastructure.   
In some contrast to earlier studies, we find FDI to be positively correlated with 
per-capita income growth across Indian states, and negatively correlated with the share 
of people with incomes below the poverty line. This finding holds for different 
specifications of the FDI variable as well as for different sub-categories of FDI, 
including sector-specific FDI. This may indicate that the link between FDI and growth 
has become stronger in the aftermath of economic reforms so that earlier, much more 
skeptical assessments may no longer apply. 
Nevertheless, FDI is unlikely to work wonders for India’s regional development. It is 
only for relatively rich states that a higher FDI intensity is associated with a significantly 
higher growth rate in the post-reform era. By contrast, FDI does not appear to be a 
decisive factor for the growth prospects of less advanced states. 
All in all, it appears to be unreasonable to expect that booming FDI in India will lead 
to regional convergence. Our empirical findings fit well into the theoretical reasoning of 
Aghion  et al. (2006). The Schumpeterian growth model presented by Aghion et al. 
suggests that local conditions are essential for the effects of FDI in host countries like 
India. In particular, FDI tends to leave growth unaffected in poor regions where local 
companies operate far off the technological frontier. Under such conditions, 
FDI-induced spillovers are impaired by lacking incentives of local companies to 
innovate, as well as their weak capacity to absorb superior foreign technology. Similarly, 
Blomström and Kokko (1998) as well as Blomström et al. (2001) conclude from reviews 
of the literature that spillovers depend on the absorptive capacity of local firms, with 
small gaps encouraging spillovers and large gaps inhibiting them. Findlay (1978, p. 2) 
argued in the late 1970s already that economic backwardness encourages technology 
transfers provided that the technology gap “must not be too wide.” 
At the same time, the tentative findings presented above suggest several directions 
for future empirical research on the effects of FDI on economic growth and poverty 
alleviation in India. First of all, the data on the regional distribution of FDI need to be 
complemented with similarly disaggregated data on control variables that might be 
relevant in the context of economic growth and regional development. Second, the 
state-level analysis in the present paper may be refined by a more detailed regional 
disaggregation. The above noted concentration of FDI within individual states provides 
first hints that regional development may diverge even at the level of districts. Yet, it 
remains open to question whether the dissemination of FDI effects is more pronounced FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POST-REFORM INDIA  79 
at the district level than at the level of Indian states, the population of many of which by 
far exceeds the population of various countries. Finally, it would be desirable to account 
for additional aspects of the heterogeneity of FDI in India. For instance, it is widely 
believed that greenfield FDI generates stronger investment and growth effects than 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which, at least in the first round, amount to little 
more than a change in ownership and do not add to overall investment. Pursuing all 























Nicobar Islands  22262 0.3  42  83 11.6  14  -  8.13 
Andhra Pradesh  15049 74.9  272 54  7.0  65 83.5 4.18 
Arunchal Pradesh  13669 1.1  13  55  8.2  22  -  4.07 
Assam  10080 26.0  332 71  9.9  109 23.9 2.41 
Bihar  4794 79.1  840 46  6.0  51 25.1 3.44 
Chandigarh  42942 0.8 5868 82  11.8  1604 -  53.30 
Chhattisgarh  10405 20.4  151 -  -  -  -  - 
Delhi  37065 13.0  8754 -  17.0  1862 47.5  45.93 
Goa  44349 1.3  354 84  11.3  264  -  38.61 
Gujarat  18831 48.7  249 69  8.3  48  148.2 7.85 
Haryana  21105 20.2  457 65  9.0  65 88.1 6.60 
Himachal 
Pradesh  18160 5.9  106 75  12.1  53 50.8 8.39 
Jammu & 
Kashmir  12373 9.7  43  66  7.1  11  42.3  2.85 
Jharkhand  7238 26.0  327  -  -  -  -  - 
Karnataka  16345 51.4  268 63  10.2  79 84.9 5.54 
Kerala  18117 31.5  810 91  10.7  382 67.7 7.23 
Madhya 
Pradesh  11764 58.4  190 56  10.2  46 74.5 4.07 
Maharashtra  22975 93.8  305 74  10.7  124  132.3 9.71 
Manipur  11059 2.3  102 73  9.8  51  5.7 1.43 
Meghalaya  13088 2.2  100 78  7.1  41 85.4 4.95 
Mizoram  14909 0.9  41  94 10.3  23  -  3.35 
Nagaland  12594 1.8  110 86  6.0  123  3.3 3.25 
Orissa  9486 36.0  231 57  7.5  169 55.6 2.46 
Pondicherry  29383 1.0 1945 81  12.6  511  -  10.79 PETER NUNNENKAMP AND RUDI STRACKE  80 
Punjab  22745 23.6  468 68  8.5  128  166.7  13.35 
Rajasthan  12765 54.1  158 53  8.6  41 46.0 3.07 
Sikkim  14761 0.5  72  75  8.0  26  74.5  7.75 
Tamil Nadu  18337 61.2  471 71  9.8  118 98.9 5.60 
Tripura  13195 3.2  302 78  8.6  148 26.8 2.49 
Uttaranchal  11443 8.2  154 -  -  -  -  - 
Uttar Pradesh  8970 159.8  663  55  5.9 97  35.1  3.85 
West Bengal  14817 78.6  886 -  6.6  89  55.5  5.38 
Notes: 
a FDI determinants at the state level used in the regressions reported in Table 2, all figures refer to 
1999/2000. Not listed due to data constraints; Dadra & Haveli, Daman & Diu, and Lakshadweep. 
b Per-capita 
income in Rs., based on net state domestic product at factor cost. 
c Number per square km. 
d Student 
enrolment in % of population at all levels higher than primary schooling. 
e Km per 100 square km of state 
area. 
f kW per 1000 inhabitants. 
g Bank deposits, 1000 Rs. per capita. 
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